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THE EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF A VIEW-
ANOTHER WORD
THOMAS P. HARDMAN*
N a recent important case in point, Frampton v. Consolidated
Bus Lines,' the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
quoted the following language from a textbook as a "well-stated"
proposition of law: "A view is for the purpose of informing the
jurors upon any pertinent inquiry being made in the trial of the
case, and the things which they observe upon such view, so far as
they are pertinent to show anything proper to be proved, are to be
considered by them the same as any other evidence introduced in
the case. ' 2 Moreover, the result reached in the Frampton case
fully supports the quotation.
In the latest West Virginia case in point, however, Malamphy
v. Potomac Edison Co.,3 our court said (quaere: is it decision or is
it dictum?) that "The primary object of having a jury view premises
in question is to display the local situation so that the jury may
better understand the record evidence. The view is not to furnish
essential evidence dehors the record."4 And to support this proposi-
tion, commonly known as the ancillary theory, the court cited the
Frampton case.
In a recent article in the Law Review5 the present writer at-
tempted to prove that, notwithstanding numerous dicta to the
contrary in this jurisdiction, all the square decisions on the ques-
tion, up to and including the Frampton case, follow the theory
that a view taken by a trier of fact is substantive evidence, and is
to be considered by the court like any other evidence. The prob-
lem presented in these cases so frequently arises in everyday litiga-
tion that the Malamphy case seems worthy of brief comment.
Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
134 W. Va. 815, 62 S.E.2d 126 (1950).
2 Id. at pp. 836, 837, 62 S.E.2d at 142. The quotation is from 11 MICHIE'SJURIsPRUDENcE OF VIRGINIA & WEST VIRGINIA, Jury, § 65 (1950), and is based
exclusively on two West Virginia cases: State v. McCausland, 82 W. Va. 525,
96 S.E. 938 (1918); Thorn v. Addison Bros, 119 W. Va. 479, 194 S.E. 771 (1937).
Accord: Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 137 W. Va. 19, 69 S.E.2d 393
(1952).
3 83 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1954).
4The court quoted this statement with approval from Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
v. Allen, 113 W. Va. 691, 169 S.E. 610 (1933).
I Hardman, The Evidentiary Effect of a View: Stare Decisis or Stare Dictis?
53 W. VA. L. Rnv. 103 (1951).
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In that case, in which the jury had taken a view of the damaged
premises, the appellate court set aside a verdict for two thousand
dollars on the ground that the proof did not establish the quantum
of damages. The theory of the court purports to be that where a
jury takes a view only "record evidence" may be used to support
its verdict. How far then, if at all, may a view taken by a trier of fact
(jury or judge) be used to sustain a verdict based in part on what
the trier of fact has observed by any of the senses, sight or other?
In discussing the point raised in the instant case, the court
began as follows:
"There is some argument which seems to urge that a
view by the jury as to the damage done to the premises
suffices to supply defects in the proof as to the quantum of
damages. This Court has discussed the function and effect
of a view by a jury. In Fox v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 34 W.
Va. 466, 480, 12 S.E. 757, 762, this Court, in discussing such
question raised by an instruction given by the trial court,
used the following language: '* * * The object of such view
must be to acquaint the jury with the situation of the premises,
and the location of the property, so that they may better under-
stand the evidence, and apply it to the local surroundings of
the case. To instruct them (the jury] to disregard everything
they saw, and every impression they received from the view,
would be to mislead them, because it is apparent that the
view would be absolutely useless, and would not conduce to
a "just decision," if both sight and apprehension were to be
closed against the results naturally to be derived from an
inspection of the premises .... '
The court evidently regarded the Fox case, and rightly so re-
garded it,7 as supporting the theory that what a jury [or judge
sitting without a jury] observes on a view is usable as substantive
evidence-a theory contra to the one sponsored in the instant case.,
Moreover, the Fox case, the leading case in point in West Virginia,
has never been overruled.9 To be sure, the court in the Malamphy
case did use language which purports to approve the so-called
ancillary theory. It is believed; however, that this theory cannot
6 Malamphy v. Potomac Edison Co., 83 S.E.2d 755, 759 (W. Va. 1954).
- For a more or less detailed evaluation of the Fox case and other West
Virginia cases cited by the court in the instant case, see Hardman, supra note 5.
8 With respect to the passage quoted in the body of this Comment, the
court in the instant case said: "Later opinions of this Court, we think, state the
true function and effect of a view by the jury." As to this, see Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. v. Johnson, 137 W. Va. 19, 69 S.E.2d 393 (1952). See also the reference
in note 7, supra.
9 See note 7 supra.
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be justifiably regarded as "the law of the case".' Indeed, the court.
per Lovins, J., practically conceded that its discussion of the question
was obiter only. Said the court:
"The controlling question presented on this writ of error
relates to the proof of the quantum of damages allegedly
suffered by the plaintiff.
"Before discussing that question, we advert to other ques-
tions which we think are important, though not controlling,
and should be clarified upon another trial.""
Thereupon the court, before it considered the controlling ques-
tion, proceeded to set forth (for use "upon another trial") what is
called "the true function and effect of a view by a jury."'12 That
the theory thus expounded is obiter only is additionally evidenced
by the fact that, as above indicated, the instant case, in support of
its conclusion, cited the Frampton case which follows the decision
in the Fox case. (Incidentally, perhaps significantly, the syllabus
of the instant case does not include any reference to the point herein
discussed-not that the present commentator believes that "the'
10 For one reason, it is believed that the result actually arrived at in the
instant case could be readily reached by applying the theory of the Fox case
and the Malamphy case, namely, that what a trier of fact observes on a view
is independent evidence. In a situation such as that in the instant case, the
fact that the jury had taken a view is not an insuperable objection to setting
aside a verdict based in part on the "evidence" observed at the view. To be
sure, the reviewing court does not have such non-record evidence before it;
but if an appellate court could never set aside a verdict as unsupported by
sufficient evidence except where all the evidence usable by the trial court is
before the reviewing court, no verdict or almost no verdict could ever be set
aside as unsupported by the evidence; for there is almost always before the
trial court a very considerable amount of evidence which does not get into the
record, notably, the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand-a very cogent kind
of evidence which is admittedly usable in the trial court. See WMoRE,
EVIDENCE §§ 274, 946 (3d ed. 1940). Moreover, in the instant case-an action
for temporary damages-the record evidence seemed quite probative to the
effect that the damage to the property in question could not have been very
great whereas, from the rather ephemeral nature of most of the damage, a
view taken by the jury a considerable time after the injury was inflicted could
not have been very enlightening. Consequently in such a case, it would seem
that a verdict based in part on what a jury observed on such a view could jus-
tifiably be set aside by an appellate court on the ground that it was not supported
by the evidence, (including the "evidence" obtained on the view).
i1 Malamphy v. Potomac Edison Co., 83 S.E.2d at 758.
12 Id. at 759. 'The latest West Virginia case cited to support this "true
function" of a view is the Frampton case (1950), and the concluding observation
of the court in the Frampton case-cited supra in the body of this Comment-
approves the theory that the knowledge obtained by a trier of fact from a view
is substantive evidence.
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syllabus is the law in West Virginia"!)0' Furthermore, both the
Fox case and the Frampton case state the generally accepted rule,
and the rule approved by the most authoritative textbooks. 4
Wigmore cites the West Virginia decisions as supporting the com-
monly approved rule5 Also, in the latest textbook on Evidence
published in 19541 and an excellent one, the author uses the
following persuasive argument which is believed to be irrefutable:
"The impression on the senses of the jury or judge from a
view of . . . [objects or other matter pertinent in a case] is
information of the most direct and convincing kind about the
relevant facts. It is exactly the same process of proof as
obtains when objects are exhibited to the jury in the court-
room as demonstrative evidence. Some courts, however,
troubled by the fact that the impressions gained from the view
may not be embodied in the record on appeal in the same way
that the testimony of witnesses is transmitted, have put the
cart before the horse and have said that since such informa-
tion cannot be reflected in the record it cannot be evidence.
They have said that the purpose of the view is solely to aid
the jury to understand and evaluate the testimony of the
witnesses. It runs counter to common sense, however, to sup.
pose that jurors, no matter how they may be instructed, will
disregard the evidence of their own senses . . . [obtained
from a view] when it comes in conflict with contrary testimony
of all the witnesses. It seems that the more realistic conclu-
sion is the one reached by a substantial number of other
courts, namely, that the knowledge derived from a view is
evidence which the jury may use as a basis for finding the
facts so disclosed.' 7
3-3 See Hardman, supra note 5. And-interestingly-a recent West Virginia
decision specifically supports the theory that the syllIabus is not necessarily
"the law of the case." See State v. Franklin, 79 S.E.d 692 (IV. Va. 1953);
opinion by Riley, J.; dissenting opinion by Lovins, J. Said the court: " In the
decision of this case we are of opinion that we need not apply the ruling of the
Court in the case of State v. Collins, 108 W. Va. 98, 150 S.E. 369, though the
broad wording of point 2 of the syllabus of that case, considered as an abstract
statement of law, would justify us in so doing. . . point 2 of the syllabus in
the Collins case is broader than is required for a decision of the case, and the
holding of this Court, as disclosed by the opinion and the facts contained
therein.
"Much has been said on the question whether the syllabus or the opinion,
or both, represent the law of a case decided by this Court. In Koblegard v. Hale,
60 W. Va. 37, 53 S.E. 793, 794, 116 Am. St. Rep. 868, this Court refused to apply
the language of the syllabus in the case of Medford v. Levy, 31 W. Va. 649, 8
S.E. 802, 2 L.R.A. 368, saying: 'The syllabus of the case must, of course, be read
in the light of the opinion.'"
14 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1168 (3d ed.); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 183 (1954);
TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 341-345 (1952). 2 JONES, EVIDENCE
IN CIVIL CASES § 407 (4th ed. 1938) seems to support this theory.
151V5,IGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1168. Wigmore, however, cites only the cases
which he considers important.
16 McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE (1954).
17 Id. at 392-393.
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Also, and importantly, in what seems to be the latest West
Virginia decision in point prior to the instant case, Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co. v. Johnson,8 decided in 1952-a case which the court
did not cite in the instant case-our court said, both in the opinion
and in the syllabus, that . . . "the things which they [the jurors]
observe upon such view, so far as they are pertinent to show any-
thing proper to be proved, are to be considered by them the same
as any other evidence introduced in the case."' '  Furthermore, the
holding of the court fully sustains this unequivocal statement. And
in a leading case decided by the United States Supreme Court, in a
well-considered opinion by Justice Cardozo, the Court said with
respect to a view by a jury, that "its inevitable effect is that of evi-
dence, no matter what label the judge may choose to give it."' '
Hence, notwithstanding the "label" used by the court in the instant
case, perhaps it may be justifiable to paraphrase here the substance
of the conclusion reached in the writer's previous discussion of the
precedents in point:
To sum up, it is believed that the seeming inconsistencies in the
West Virginia cases are, so far as the holdings go, seeming only and
not real, and that if we look behind form to substance-if we look
to the law actually enforced by the courts, whatever "labels" may
be attached on occasion-our apparently conflicting decisions are
reducible to one simple proposition, and a sound one, that a view
by a trier of fact is substantive evidence and is usable essentially
like any other evidence. It would seem to follow that the so-called
ancillary theory, which the Malamphy case purports to support, is
not a rule or principle so established by the actual holdings in the
West Virginia cases as "to justify a prediction with reasonable cer-
tainty that it will be enforced by the courts [and by administrative
tribunals] if its authority is challenged"-which is perhaps the best
brief test or approach for determining what the law of a case
is Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Johnson, 137 W. Va. 19, 69 S.E.2d 393 (1952).
19 In a recent California case squarely in point, Neel v. Mannings, 19 Cal. 2d
647, 122 P.2d 576 (1942), sustaining a verdict where the jury had taken a view
of damaged premises, the court said: ". .. the jury made an inspection of the
defendant's premises and observed ... the stairway .... The knowledge acquired
by this visit to the scene of the accident, supplementing the information embodied
in the above-mentioned exhibits relative to the dimensional facts as to the.
construction of the stairway, was independent evidence in the case, and un-
doubtedly it had much to do with the jury's determination of this issue in
accord with the plaintiff's claim."
20 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 121 (1934).
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actually is.21 It is deferentially submitted therefore that the pur-
ported doctrine of the instant case should not be deemed an authori-
tative basis of prediction as to what the courts will do in fact in
this jurisdiction: it is only a dictum. Judgment non obstante dicto!
21 The quotation is from CARnozo, GROWTH OF THE LAW 52 (1924). Of
course there are various tests or theories for determining the ratio decidendi
of a case. The "prediction theory" herein adopted, and quoted from Cardozo,
is based on a famous leading article by Mr. Justice Holmes in which he said:
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pre-
tentious, are what I mean by the law." Holmes, Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REv. 457, 461 (1897). This statement by Holmes must be interpreted, in the
light of Holmes' many other utterances on the question, to mean that law is
made up of the various bases of prophecy as to what the courts [and adminis-
trative tribunals] will do in fact. See, in general, GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES
OF TE LAw c. 2 (2d ed. 1921); Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of
a Case, 40 YAr.E L. J. 161 (1930). Cf. Hardman, "The Law"-in West Virginia,
47 W. VA. L. Ray. 23 (1940).
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